Program Evaluation as a Decision Problem by Rajeev Dehejia
“Clinton Signs Bill to Cut Welfare and Change State Role”
The New York Times, August 23, 1996
In a sweeping reversal of federal policy, President Clinton on Thursday ended six decades of guaranteed help to the
nation's poorest children by signing into law a vast new welfare overhaul requiring the 50 states to deal more directly
with the social burdens and the budget expense of poverty.
"Today we are taking a historic chance to make welfare what it was meant to be: a second chance, not a way of life,"
Clinton declared in signing the measure, which will affect tens of millions of poor Americans, largely by mandating
work requirements and imposing a five-year lifetime limit on welfare help to needy families....
The heart of the complex new law abolishes Aid to Families With Dependent Children, the government’s welfare
bulwark, which provides monthly cash benefits to 12.8 million people, including more than 8 million children.
This is to be replaced by a system of block grants and vast new authority for the states, in the hope that they can fash-
ion new work and welfare programs to solve the long-intractable problem of dependence on government.
Job creation will be a particular state burden, since the law requires most poor adults to find a job within two years of
first receiving aid.1. Introduction
This paper evaluates the Alameda portion of the Greater Avenues for Independence
(GAIN) program with the aims both of understanding the impact of the program and of
offering new methodological perspectives on program evaluation. An understanding of
GAIN is valuable not only because it is very similar to California’s current welfare pro-
gram (CalWORKs), but also because similar welfare-to-work programs have been initiated
by many states since the 1980s (Greenberg and Wiseman [1992] survey 24 such pro-
grams).  At another level, GAIN is but one in a long line of social experiments (see
Burtless [1995] for a recent survey), and methodological conclusions about evaluating this
program will be of broad relevance.
Program evaluation typically is carried out by comparing the values of a range of
outcomes of interest between the treatment and control groups, and considering the sta-
tistical significance of these treatment impacts.
1,2 For example, compared with AFDC, the
GAIN program
3 causes a positive but not statistically significant increase in earnings and
the probability of employment, and a significant increase in government welfare expendi-
ture. Usually such differences are considered for various subsets of the sample.
The methodology I adopt differs because it models program evaluation as a deci-
sion problem. I focus on two aspects of what is in reality a complicated decision. First, in
                                                       
1 There are many relevant issues other than obtaining unbiased estimates of the treatment effect, such as
the interaction of local conditions and implementation-related issues on the outcome.  See Heckman
(1992) and Heckman and Smith (1995).
2 It is well known that in randomized trials such comparisons give unbiased estimates of the treatment
effect (see Fisher [1935] and Neyman [1935]). The debate on the non-experimental evaluation side is
more controversial; see Dehejia and Wahba [1996], Heckman [1989, 1990], Heckman and Robb [1985,
1986], Lalonde [1986], Manski [1989, 1993], and Manski and Garfinkel [1992], inter alia.
3 I will use the term GAIN to denote the GAIN package of services (including AFDC), and AFDC to de-
note the basic AFDC package.2
choosing between the treatment and control programs, I pay particular attention to un-
certainty about the outcome of interest, and how that uncertainty affects the choice be-
tween programs. It is well-recognized that a t-statistic does not embody all the information
relevant for a rational decisionmaker.
4 I instead use Bayesian predictive distributions –
distributions which capture all of the uncertainty about the outcome of interest – which
then allow for the use of standard expected utility theory in comparing the distribution of
outcomes under treatment and control. Second, I consider how the programs being evalu-
ated will be made available in a post-evaluation context. For example, will all individuals
be required to participate in either the treatment or the control? Or is there scope to assign
participation on an individual basis? I incorporate a range of post-evaluation assignment
decisions into the process of evaluating the program by considering the (hypothetical) de-
cision of a career counselor in assigning individuals between programs.
Such issues have been largely ignored in the evaluation literature. Two important
exceptions are Heckman and Smith (1998), which offers a detailed discussion of social
welfare criteria and the assumptions needed to identify them in the data (see also Heck-
man, Smith, Clements [1997]), and Manski (1995), which considers non-parametric
bounds on the treatment impact when the treatment is non-homogeneous and post-
evaluation assignment varies. The approach in this paper is complementary because I
adopt a parametric approach which then allows me to focus on the individual-level deci-
sion problem and incorporating uncertainty into it. Of course, the notion that there is het-
                                                       
4 The finance literature has made a similar point in a very different context.  See Kandel and Stambaugh
(1996).  In addressing the questions, “Are stock market returns predictable and does it matter?” they argue
that rather than formulating the question in terms of the statistical significance of the relevant parameters
in an econometric model, one should look at the impact of such predictability on the portfolio decision of3
erogeneity in the treatment impact is not original to this paper. The contribution of this
paper lies in analyzing this heterogeneity through the individual-level decision.
Using the GAIN data, I demonstrate that the two methodological contributions
outlined above are important in understanding the impact of the GAIN treatment. I show
first that a career counselor who maximizes participants’ post-treatment probability of
employment will assign less than half of the individuals into GAIN. In terms of the evalua-
tion, this implies that the policy of assignment by a career counselor yields higher average
post-treatment earnings than either of the two policies (assigning all individuals into either
GAIN or AFDC) that are normally considered. When it is selectively available through a
career counselor GAIN emerges as viable in a cost-benefit sense as well, which overturns
the traditional evaluation of this program. More generally, whenever there is heterogeneity
in the treatment impact, such policies will be of central interest.
Second, I demonstrate that the evaluation of the GAIN program changes signifi-
cantly when one accounts for uncertainty in a consistent manner. In particular, I show that
the ranking that emerges between policies -- for example, assignment by a career coun-
selor dominates GAIN, which in turn dominates AFDC in terms of post-treatment earn-
ings -- is economically significant in the sense that the predictive distribution of earnings
under one program first-order stochastically dominates the other. Any risk-averse agent
would make an unequivocal ranking. In contrast, the ranking that emerges from a more
standard t-test on the difference in means is equivocal; the difference is mildly significant.
5
                                                                                                                                                                    
interest. See also Barberis (1996), Chamberlain and Imbens (1996), Geweke and Keane (1996), and Rossi,
McCulloch, and Allenby (1995).
5 A highly relevant issue which I do not discuss here is:  to what extent can one extrapolate the result to
other populations of interest and to other time periods?  When treatment effects are estimated at the indi-
vidual level, one can, in principle, extrapolate to other populations to the extent that they have the same4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the GAIN program
and experiment. Section 3 presents a snapshot of the findings from GAIN. Section 4 de-
scribes the econometric model that I use. Section 5 examines the decision problems faced
by typical individuals. Section 6 discusses the social decision problem and the choice of
social welfare functions.  Section 7 examines the results of the model at the social level,
and Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. The GAIN Program and the GAIN Experiment
The GAIN program began operating in California in 1986, with the aim of “increasing
employment and fostering self-sufficiency” among AFDC recipients (see Riccio, et al.
[1994]). In 1988, six counties -- Alameda, Butte, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Diego, and
Tulare -- were chosen for an experimental evaluation of the benefits of GAIN.  A subset of
AFDC recipients (single parents with children aged six or older and unemployed heads of
two-parent households) were required to participate in the GAIN experiment (see Table
1). For its evaluation Alameda further confined itself to long-term welfare recipients (indi-
viduals already having received welfare for two years or more).
Potential participants from the mandatory group were referred to a GAIN orienta-
tion session when they visited an Income Maintenance office (either to sign up for welfare
or to qualify for continued benefits).
6 As a result, the chronology of the data and subse-
quent results is in experimental time, rather than calendar time. No sanctions were used if
                                                                                                                                                                    
support in the space of pre-treatment variables as the original sample (assuming ignorable assignment).  If
the model is suitably specified, one can also extrapolate through time.  These issues will be the subject of
future research.
6 In some counties AFDC recipients were allowed to volunteer for the GAIN program, but these units are
not included in the public use sample.5
individuals failed to attend the orientation sessions.  However, once individuals started in
the GAIN program, sanctions were used to ensure their ongoing participation. At the time
of enrollment into the program, a variety of background characteristics were recorded for
both treatment and control units, including: demographic characteristics; results of a
reading and mathematics proficiency test; and data on 10 quarters of pre-treatment earn-
ings, AFDC, and food stamp receipts.
7
Of those who attended the orientation session, a fraction were randomly assigned
to the GAIN program,
8 and the others were prohibited from participating in GAIN.
9 Each
of the counties randomized a different proportion of its participants into treatment, rang-
ing from a 50-50 split in Alameda to an 85-15 split in San Diego (see Table 1).
 Because
assignment to treatment was random, the distribution of pre-treatment covariates is bal-
anced across the treatment and control groups; the data legend lists each of the covari-
ates.
10 In terms of the chronology of data gathering, “experimental” time (which I also re-
                                                       
7 Data on AFDC and Food Stamp receipts were taken from each county’s welfare records.  Data on earn-
ings were taken from the California State Unemployment Insurance Earnings and Benefits Records.
Other background characteristics were taken from California’s client information (“GAIN-26”) form.  See
Riccio, et al. (1994).
8 The randomization was (as far as we know) independent of pre-treatment covariates.  A different frac-
tion was randomized into treatment in each county.  See Table 2.
9 Of course, these individuals could participate in non-GAIN employment-creating activities.  The exis-
tence of non-GAIN activities is important in interpreting the treatment effect from GAIN.  The treatment
effect measures the increase in earnings, employment, etc., from the availability of and encouragement (or
requirement) to use GAIN-related activities compared with pre-existing employment services.  To the ex-
tent that AFDC benefits are received by both groups, the real comparison at one level is between the two
differing packages of supplementary services and requirements.
10 Since participants were randomized after registration, we expect to find that the distribution of back-
ground characteristics is (up to sampling variation) the same across the treatment and control groups
within counties; this is partly true.  Let b be a vector of pre-treatment characteristics. Assuming that
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1 2 S c .  The p-values are:  Alameda 0.3364, Butte 0.5346, Los Angeles
0, Riverside 0, San Diego 0, and Tulare 0.0784.  There are many possible reasons for the seeming lack of6
fer to as “post-experimental” or “post-treatment” time) begins when individuals attend the
GAIN orientation session. The early stages of experimental time thus coincide with the
education and training part of the GAIN program.
11
In the GAIN experiment, the treatment is participating in the GAIN program; the
control is receiving standard AFDC benefits.  The GAIN program works as follows:
based on test results and an interview with a case manager, participants are assigned to
one of two activities.  Those deemed not to be in need of basic education are referred to a
job search activity (which lasts about three weeks); those who do not find work are placed
in job training (which includes vocational or on-the-job training, and paid or unpaid work
experience, lasting about three to four months).  Those deemed to be in need of basic edu-
cation may choose to begin job search immediately, but if they fail to find a job they must
register for preparation toward either the General Educational Development certificate,
Adult Basic Education, or English as a Second Language programs (lasting three to four
months).
12 Participants were exempted from the requirement to participate in GAIN ac-
tivities if they found work on their own.
 13
                                                                                                                                                                    
randomization in the three larger counties, including the possibility that randomization proportions may
have varied across administrative offices within each county.
11 More precisely, individuals were registered in the first quarter of experimental time.  This means that in
some cases the first quarter of experimental time in fact includes information from one or two months
prior to the commencement of the experiment.  For example, for an individual who attended an orienta-
tion session in February 1989, the first quarter of experimental time is from January to March 1989.  Of
course, some part of the first and second quarters could be spent participating in treatment activities.  Pre-
treatment data would cover the 10 quarters from July 1986 to December 1988.
12 The public use data do not contain information on each individual’s participation in the various compo-
nents of the program.
13 Note that only about 85 percent of the treated units actively participated in any GAIN activities (though
by virtue of being in the GAIN sample they did attend an orientation meeting); the balance satisfied the
requirements of the GAIN program on their own (in most cases finding employment within the first two
or three quarters of experimental time). Thus, as observed earlier, this is important in interpreting the
treatment effect as a comparison between earnings, employment, etc., when individuals are required to
find a job or to participate in GAIN-related activities, and when they are not obliged to find jobs and only
pre-existing employment-related services are available.7
3. The GAIN Data in Alameda
From the six counties available in the GAIN experiment, this paper focuses on Alameda
county. I briefly review the pre-treatment characteristics of the sample, and analyze the
treatment effect on earnings and employment status.  Finally, I touch on some examples of
heterogeneity in the treatment effect.
Table 2 presents a profile of the participants in Alameda county:  85 percent are
women, who on average have more than two children; the mean level of education is
grade 10; and a quarter have previously participated in training programs.  The average
level of pre-treatment earnings is very low, ranging from $150 to $190 per quarter, but
because 87 percent of pre-treatment earnings are zero, the average of non-zero pre-
treatment earnings is higher, on the order of $1,110 per quarter.
14
Table 3 explicitly shows the impact of GAIN on the probability of unemployment
for the 13 post-treatment quarters.  In the first post-treatment quarter GAIN’s impact is
negative; this is not surprising since treatment units are participating in training activities in
the first quarter.  After a few quarters the treatment effect increases to the range of 4 per-
cent to 6 percent (and is statistically significant).
15
Figure 1 displays the average treatment effect on earnings for 13 quarters for each
of the six counties.  The figures illustrate the basic conclusion that GAIN participants in
most counties enjoyed higher post-treatment earnings than their control counterparts. Ta-
                                                       
14 Seven individuals are excluded from the original sample because of apparent coding errors in their co-
variates. These seven individuals are either coded as having 70 children or a previous hourly wage of
more than $300.8
ble 4 explores the impact for Alameda in greater detail using an OLS regression of earn-
ings on treatment status and covariates. We see a pattern similar to that found in Table 3:
the treatment effect starts out negative, and then increases in most of the subsequent peri-
ods (with a number of statistically significant effects).
The assumption of a constant treatment effect across all individuals is very restric-
tive and unrealistic. The average treatment effects considered in the previous section po-
tentially embody an array of heterogeneous treatment effects. Two examples illustrate this
point. Figure 2 explores the interaction between the treatment effect and the score on the
reading test: individuals who score 200 or more enjoy a higher treatment effect (although
the standard error is quite large).  In Figure 3, we see that individuals who have previously
participated in job training programs also enjoy a higher treatment effect.  Many such in-
teractions potentially exist in the data.  Thus, in subsequent sections the econometric
model will allow for a heterogeneous treatment effect.
4. A Model of the Data
4.1 The Statistical Model
In my implementation I model earnings, given that AFDC and food stamps in principle are
determined by non-stochastic rules. I denote the earnings component of the vector of out-
come variables asYi
t
j , where j=1 (GAIN) or 0 (AFDC). Yi
t
1 is interpreted as individual i’s
earnings in period t if she was in GAIN, and Yi
t
0 as her earnings if she was in AFDC; ob-
viously one of these is counter-factual. Thus, observed earnings are defined as:
                                                                                                                                                                    
15 An earlier version of this paper (Dehejia [1997]) examines the impact of lagged employment status on
the treatment impact, and shows that the treatment increases the probability of transition from unemploy-9
Y TY T Y it i i
t
i i
t = + - 1 0 1 ( ) ,
where Ti is a treatment indicator (=1 if individual i was assigned to GAIN, and =0 if she
was assigned to AFDC). Realizations of the random variable are denoted in lower case, yit.
A key feature of the distribution of earnings, which influences the model choice
and was highlighted in Section 3, is the mass point in the distribution of earnings at zero.
The strategy adopted is to model the probability of positive earnings and the distribution
of positive earnings separately.  For the former, a probit model is used for an indicator for
positive earnings; for the latter, log earnings are modeled using a mixture of normals.
Since individuals were randomly assigned into treatment and control, the model does not
have to correct for sample selection bias in assignment to treatment.
Define an indicator variable, yit
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for i=1,...,I and t=1,...,t (the probit model). The vector of explanatory variables is given by
xit={11 it,L,1t it, [11 itL1t it]·Ti, Zi￿Ti, 1(Yi t-1=0)}, a (2t + k + 1)-vector of regressor vari-
ables. [11 itL1t it] is a set of indicator variables for each quarter of post-experimental time
                                                                                                                                                                    
ment to employment. For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see Ashenfelter and Card (1985).10
(1j it=1 if t=j, =0 otherwise), giving each period its own intercept.  The treatment indicator
is interacted with [11 itL1t it]. Since each period corresponds to experimental, rather than
calendar, time, the treatment dummies produce a profile of the treatment effects over 13
quarters. Interactions between k exogenous regressors, Zi, and the treatment indicator are
also included, which allow the treatment effect to vary with observable pre-treatment
characteristics. These characteristics include: indicators for the age and number of chil-
dren, ethnicity, educational attainment, score on the reading and mathematics tests, sex, an
indicator for previous participation in other training programs, 10 periods of pre-treatment
earnings history, and a calendar time trend. The model allows for persistence in a very
simple form, through lagged earnings, in particular an indicator for zero lagged earnings.
For positive earnings, a mixture-of-normals likelihood is adopted for log earnings:
{ } { }
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where { } ~
Yit  is the log of the positive elements of { } Yit . Note that (M) conditions only on
the indicator for positive lagged earnings (rather than the level of lagged earnings).
I use diffuse priors for the parameters of both models. These are discussed in Ap-
pendix A, which also discusses the estimation procedure in detail.
4.2 The Predictive Distribution
Because the decision problems associated with program evaluation are in the space of out-
comes, not the space of the parameters of the model, it is important to construct a distri-
bution which embodies all of the uncertainty from the model and its estimation in the out-11
come space. The estimation procedure, a Gibbs sampler, produces draws from the poste-
rior distribution of the parameters of the model. For each model, we can use these draws
to simulate the (posterior) predictive distribution of the outcomes; i.e., from (P) a distri-
bution for the probability of positive earnings and from (M) a distribution for the level of
positive earnings, in which we integrate out for the uncertain parameters.
Conditional on parameters, we can simulate the distribution by drawing for YI+1,1
(from the likelihoods (P) and (M)) and substituting forward for earnings in subsequent pe-
riods. To obtain the predictive distribution, we must account for parameter uncertainty;
thus, we use draws from the posterior distribution of Q (obtained from the two Gibbs
samplers outlined in the appendix). For each draw from p(Q|Data), we simulate the distri-
bution from the likelihoods.
Thus, using this procedure, we obtain the joint predictive distribution of earnings
for individual I+1 from periods 1,...,13. Given the values of the covariates, this predictive
distribution represents the distribution of possible values for earnings incorporating all un-
certainty (see the Appendix for further details).
4.3 The Choice and Fit of the Model
One issue in model choice, given the use of probit and mixture-of-normals likelihoods,  is
the use of the indicator for positive lagged earnings, rather than simply lagged earnings.
For the GAIN data, a standard AR(1) does not capture the dynamics of the earnings proc-
ess well. In particular, for individuals with positive earnings in a given period, in the fol-
lowing period it tends to over-estimate the persistence in their level of earnings. When ex-
trapolating forward 10 or 12 periods, the process dramatically overstates the level of12
earnings. Hence, I use an alternative specification, with an indicator for when lagged
earnings are positive.
Another major issue is the choice of likelihood. Figures 4 and 5 give a sense of the
fit of the model. These figures show the density of the empirical distribution of earnings
for treated and control units (estimated through a histogram), averaged over the 13 post-
treatment quarters, and plot the density of the predictive distribution of earnings. The joint
predictive distribution of earnings across 13 periods is averaged over the individuals in the
Alameda sample and over the 13 periods to produce the average predictive distribution,
which is then plotted.
The use of a probit to model the probability of positive earnings is not controver-
sial (other choices such as a logit yield similar results, and the probit is computationally
convenient). As we see from the figures, the model fits the mass point at zero with sub-
stantial accuracy.  For positive earnings, the figures illustrate the value of using a mixture
of normals. The empirical distributions of log earnings for treated and control units are
well approximated by the mixture because, for both distributions, the mixture is able to
reflect the skewness of the empirical distribution. In fact, with a single normal, the predic-
tive distribution of earnings would have a much thicker upper tail than the empirical distri-
bution.
16,17
                                                       
16 Given the predictive distribution it is possible to test for the fit of various features of the distribution.
These tests essentially reconfirm the impression conveyed by the figures. The predictive distribution has a
greater mass at lower levels of earnings than the empirical distribution.(The hypothesis that the median of
the empirical distribution corresponds to the median of the predictive distribution is rejected). However,
the predictive distribution fits the spread of the empirical distribution very well. The discrepancy in the
95-5-precentile spread is 2 per cent and in the 75-25 spread is 3 per cent. A similar conclusion is reached
for the control distribution. An additional mixture component might help to better fit the peak in the em-
pirical distribution, but when combined with the probit model, the effect on the overall predictive distri-
bution of earnings is minimal.13
5. The Individual-Level Impact
This section studies the individual-level impact of the GAIN treatment. This not only pro-
vides a detailed view of the impact of the program, but also lays the foundations for the
analysis of the social welfare problem in Section 7.
Imagine that a career counselor has to choose whether to assign an individual into
GAIN and AFDC. For the career counselor, an individual is identified by her pre-
treatment characteristics. Thus, the key assumption is that the individuals under consid-
eration are exchangeable with those in the data, conditional on observable covariates:
earnings for individuals with the same covariates are taken to be drawn from the same
distribution. Given that the decision is being made by a career counselor, not the individual
herself, the assumption seems reasonable.
18
5.1 Two Typical Examples
Tables 5a and 5b list the pre-treatment covariates of two individuals from the Alameda
county sample for whom we see typical patterns in the distributions of earnings under
treatment and control (one being a clear winner from GAIN and the other a clear loser).
The first is a woman (“Ms. Thirteen Fifty-Three”), aged 42.  She is the head of a single-
                                                                                                                                                                    
17 The choice of how many mixture components to use is heuristic: the use of more than two mixture
components does not seem to improve the fit of the model. An alternative would be to use a method which
endogenously selects the number of mixture components, but the added complexity is probably not war-
ranted given that the empirical distributions are well behaved.
18 The assumption of exchangeability conditional on covariates is not unique to my application. This as-
sumption, or some alternative, is needed any time we want to extrapolate from a dataset to a new situa-
tion. Unless information on important unobserved variables such as preferences is explicitly solicited, one
must use the exchangeability assumption or some other equally strong assumption specifying the form of
the lack of exchangeability. If the individual herself is making the choice, we must assume that any pri-
vate information she has is independent of the observed covariates.14
parent household, has one child between the age of 12 and 18, and has completed high
school and three years of additional training. Her earnings history shows that she was em-
ployed in two of 10 quarters prior to the experiment.  The second individual (“Ms. One”)
is a 32-year-old woman, the head of a single-parent household, has one child between the
age of 6 and 11 and two children between 12 and 18, and has an educational attainment of
grade nine.  Her earnings history shows zero earnings in each of the 10 pre-treatment pe-
riods.  I consider each individual in turn.
Table 6a shows the probability of positive earnings and the mean and standard de-
viation of the predictive distribution of earnings (including the mass point at zero earnings)
for each period under both treatment and control for Ms. Thirteen Fifty-Three. Her mean
earnings in the first three periods are lower under treatment than under the control, but her
probability of positive earnings in these periods is higher under treatment. Intuitively, even
though she is more likely to find a job under the treatment program, any job she finds is
not likely to pay more in the first three periods than a job she might have found otherwise.
However, from the fourth period on, both earnings and the probability of employment are
higher under treatment. The profile of the treatment effect is increasing, in a pattern simi-
lar to that depicted in Figure 1 for Alameda county on average. However, the standard
deviation of control earnings is higher than that of treatment earnings, and the difference
between the treatment and control earnings is small compared with the magnitude of the
standard deviation.
19 An important question is whether her risk attitude would affect her
preference between the two programs.
                                                       
19 The difference in means is not significant in the sense that the 95 percent probability intervals of the
posterior distributions overlap. But the standard deviation of the predictive distribution is not very infor-15
One way to address this would be to make an expected utility comparison from the
predictive distributions of earnings under treatment and control. Figure 6 depicts the cu-
mulative distribution functions for the predictive distribution for each of the 13 periods.
These summarize all the information available for the individual to consider, by combining
the predicted probability of positive earnings with the distribution of positive earnings.
The figures are very revealing. In periods one to three, the control earnings (almost) first-
order stochastically dominate the treatment earnings; and in periods three to 13, treatment
earnings unambiguously dominate control earnings.  This is a simple illustration of the fact
that even when the means of the two distributions under consideration are not very differ-
ent in terms of t-statistics, the underlying decision between the two may be clearcut. In
this case, as long as the individual does not have an extremely high discount rate, we
would advise her to join the treatment group.
20 Whether she, in fact, would follow this
advice depends on the factors she considers, which may or may not be part of the model.
For the second individual, matters are different.  We see in Figure 7 that her distri-
bution of earnings under the control first-order stochastically dominates her distribution
under treatment in each period.  As long as she prefers more earnings to less, she unambi-
guously would be advised not to participate in GAIN.
Of course, first-order stochastic dominance does not suffice to compare all the
distributions which arise. In general, expected utility comparisons would be required.
                                                                                                                                                                    
mative, because of the mass point in the distribution. This is another reason to examine the entire distri-
bution of earnings, which we do below.
20 What would we advise on whether she should go to school, train, etc.?  Since our data contains no in-
formation regarding this issue, we assume that the choices she makes would not be too different from
those of similar people represented in the sample.16
5.2 The Importance of Accounting for Uncertainty
A natural question which arises from the preceding analysis is: would similar decisions
have been reached if uncertainty had not been accounted for as comprehensively? In par-
ticular, one might imagine using the model described in Section 4, but, rather than using
the full posterior distribution of the parameters, using point estimates and treating them as
though they were the true parameters. Of course, even ignoring parameter uncertainty, the
intrinsic uncertainty embodied in the likelihoods of (P) and (M) has to be taken into ac-
count. Table 6b considers such an exercise for Ms. Ten, whose characteristics are given in
Table 5c. Columns 1 to 4 of Table 6b present the distribution of her earnings in each of
the 13 quarters, ignoring parameter uncertainty, but still accounting for the uncertainty
conditional on parameters. In contrast, columns 5 to 8 present the posterior distribution of
her earnings, in which parameter uncertainty is accounted for. The means of the two sets
of predictions are broadly similar, as are the standard deviations. Of course, since the un-
derlying distributions are highly non-normal, the first two moments are only partially in-
formative.  The two distributions can be compared directly through their expected utilities.
An expected utility comparison for log utility and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
preferences (with coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 3) reveals that the advice to
Ms. Ten differs depending on which distribution is used.  Ignoring parameter uncertainty,
her expected utility is higher under GAIN; instead her expected utility under the predictive
distribution is higher under AFDC.
Of course this example was chosen precisely because ignoring uncertainty leads to
different advice than accounting for it.  In cases where the two distributions are starkly
different, ignoring uncertainty would not, typically, lead to a change in decision. For the17
overall sample from Alameda, uncertainty affects the decisions of about 10 percent of in-
dividuals.
5.4 Heterogeneity and the Value of Choice
We could consider such decision problems for a wider array of individuals.  The differ-
ences in the results would reflect the underlying heterogeneity in the treatment effect.  One
view of this is presented in Table 7. Assume that each of the 1,360 individuals in the
Alameda sample is offered the choice between GAIN and AFDC, and, as in the previous
examples, imagine that these individuals are advised on the choice based on the predictive
distributions of their earnings in each period under each program.
21  For the moment, I
suppose that the advice is based on (time-additive) constant relative risk aversion prefer-
ences (with a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 3).
Table 7 presents the mean of expected post-treatment earnings under GAIN and
AFDC and the mean of pre-treatment covariates for two sub-groups of the sample: the
group that “chooses” (i.e., is advised to enter) GAIN over AFDC (for whom expected
utility from post-treatment income is higher under GAIN than under AFDC), and the
complement of this group.
22  Only 40 percent of the sample fare better (in an expected
utility sense) under GAIN than AFDC. The comparison of these two groups is revealing.
Those benefiting from GAIN have fewer children on average (except between the age of 6
                                                       
21 As mentioned in the previous section, I model only earnings. When needed, I use a deterministic rule to
fill in suitable amounts for AFDC and food stamps. For AFDC, only six individuals in the Alameda sam-
ple have both zero income and zero AFDC benefits.  About 10 percent of the sample have both positive
earnings and positive AFDC benefits.  The balance, about 90 percent of the sample, are receiving full
AFDC benefits, since they have zero earnings.  Because all of the data needed to determine AFDC bene-
fits are not available in the dataset, I use a fixed-effects regression model to predict AFDC and food stamp
benefits for these individuals.18
and 11), have higher scores on the reading and mathematics tests, have a higher level of
educational attainment, are five years younger, and half of them have previously partici-
pated in training programs.  Of particular note is the difference in the level of pre-
treatment earnings. Individuals who are advised to enter GAIN have average quarterly
earnings on the order of $300, while those who advised not to enter GAIN have quarterly
earnings on the order of $50.
Table 7 offers one view of the value of choice to individuals in the sample. For in-
dividuals with high pre-treatment earnings (the primary beneficiaries of GAIN), the poten-
tial value is high: their expected post-treatment earnings under GAIN are more than $300
per quarter higher than under AFDC. In contrast, the potential value of choice of pro-
grams is much lower for individuals with low pre-treatment earnings: the difference be-
tween their expected quarterly earnings in the two programs is $20 per quarter.
6. The Social Choice Problem
Thus far the analysis has focused on the individual-level decision between GAIN and
AFDC.  This section takes the next step by asking how the policymaker can decide which
program or combination of programs to make available, given the pattern of individual
effects.  There are two aspects to this decision.  First is the set of policies under consid-
eration, where policies are defined as rules for determining each individual’s (post-
evaluation) assignment to treatment. I consider four alternatives: (1) All individuals are
required to participate in GAIN; (2) All individuals remain in AFDC; (3) A career coun-
selor assigns each individual into the program which is most likely to give him or her posi-
                                                                                                                                                                    
22 The administrative cost of GAIN is estimated at $3,638 for 13 quarters, based on chapter 3 of Riccio, et19
tive earnings, where the decision is informed by the model in the previous sections (that is,
a policy “mandated” to increase employment); and (4) Each individual is allowed to
“choose” participation in AFDC or GAIN (i.e., individuals are assigned to GAIN or
AFDC based on the expected utility of the distribution of their earnings under each pro-
gram, where they are assumed to be either risk neutral or have CRRA preferences with the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, q, equal to 1 or 3).
23
The second aspect of the social decision is the set of criteria (social welfare func-
tions) that the policymaker uses to decide which policy to adopt. I confine the policymaker
to concerns about average outcomes such as earnings and welfare costs and concerns
about inequality in the distribution of earnings.
24 The first set of concerns is typically cap-
tured in the following social welfare functions (SWFs): (1) average (labor) earnings per
individual; (2) the average (undiscounted) value of expected income (including labor
earnings, AFDC, and food stamps) across individuals and time; (3) the fraction of indi-
viduals employed (having positive income) averaged across time periods; (4) the average
expenditure per period per person entailed by a given program; and (5) the average earn-
ings per individual minus total cost in excess of standard AFDC services (the difference in
this criterion can be interpreted as the increase in earnings minus the increase in cost). The
latter concerns are captured through three standard social welfare functions of the form:
( ) ( ) g E u Yi
t
T i i ( ) ￿ ,
                                                                                                                                                                    
al (1996).
23 Caballero (1991) suggests that a reasonable value for the coefficient of relative risk aversion is between
2 and 3.  He cites Hall (1988) and Friend and Blume (1975).
24 In this analysis the policymaker is confined to SWFs that do not depend on the joint distribution of the
outcomes because this cannot be identified without further information or stronger priors. See Heckman,
Smith, and Clements (1997).20
where the expectation is over the predictive distribution of earnings for a given set of
post-treatment assignments {Ti} and g(·) is specified according to: g(x)=x, utilitarian;
g(x)=log(x), log; or  g x ( ) = ( / ) x
1 1
- -
e e , where e=3, an intermediate case (see Deaton
and Muellbauer [1980]). I also consider a Rawlsian social welfare function of the form:
( ) { } min ( ) i i
t
T E u Y
i .
These social welfare functions are computed over the predictive distribution of earnings
which yields predictive distributions of these social welfare functions, distributions which
capture the full range of uncertainty regarding their outcomes.
7. What We Learn from GAIN
A useful benchmark for the social evaluation of GAIN is the conclusion one would
reach using differences in means rather than the predictive distributions which I consider
below. These are presented in Table 8 for the six social welfare criteria discussed in the
previous section. For post-treatment labor earnings, total income per quarter, and the
probability of employment, there is a positive but insignificant treatment impact. For total
fiscal expenditure, earnings net of costs, and total expenditure net of tax receipts, there is
a significant increase in costs.
Tables 9a, 9b, and 9c apply the social welfare analysis outlined in Section 7 to the
predictive, rather than empirical, distributions of outcomes under treatment and control,
allowing for a range of post-evaluation assignment mechanisms. I simulate the predictive
distribution of the earnings under treatment and control for 13 quarters of post-treatment
earnings for each of the 1,360 individuals in the sample, and where necessary use determi-21
nistic rules to impute values for AFDC receipts and food stamps. Individuals are assigned
to treatment and control groups as outlined in Section 6.
Table 9a uses SWFs (1) to (5) to assess the policies outlined in Section 7. Each
SWF-policy combination defines a cell, within which the social welfare function is com-
puted for the entire predictive distribution of earnings. Table 9a presents the mean and the
2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of this distribution for each cell.
Consider first SWF(1), average post-treatment earnings per person per quarter.
From the first two cells of column 1, the mean predictions from the posterior of the model
($530 for GAIN and $405 for AFDC) are similar to those obtained from the empirical
distribution, within $80 for GAIN and within $30 for AFDC. The 95 percent posterior
confidence intervals of expected quarterly earnings under treatment and control just over-
lap. Cells 3 and 4 show that the policies of mandating individuals to enroll in either GAIN
or AFDC based on their probability of post-treatment employment, or assigning them
based on their expected utility of earnings (if they are risk neutral), both yield substantially
higher average quarterly earnings than the policy of enrolling everyone in GAIN ($624 and
$654 compared with $530). At the individual level, however, the impacts of the policies
are quite different. The mandated policy assigns 300 more individuals into treatment than
the (risk neutral) “choice” policy. This difference arises because, for some individuals,
while GAIN does increase the probability of employment, it does not increase average
earnings; it steers some individuals toward jobs that pay less than those they might have
found without having their job search or employment disrupted by training. When indi-
viduals exhibit a low degree of risk aversion (q»1), the pattern of their choices is similar to22
the risk neutral case.  With q=3, more individuals prefer GAIN to AFDC.  In both cases
the average value of expected earnings is similar to the risk-neutral case.
25
In light of the analysis in Section 5, it is not surprising that the career-counselor
mechanisms yields higher earnings than GAIN (or AFDC), because these mechanisms
steer away many (about 700) individuals who are not expected to benefit from GAIN. The
difference in earnings between the individual-level choice policies and the non-choice poli-
cies, $50 to $200 per person per quarter, provides one measure of the potential value to
participants of being permitted to choose their program. The difference is large relative to
average quarterly earnings (which are on the order of $300).
The advantage of working with the entire distribution of social welfare values is
seen in Figure 8, which is analogous to Figures 6 and 7. Comparing means and their 95
percent confidence intervals, one might conclude that no decisive statement could be made
about the differences among policies considered in Table 9a: even though the means of the
policies are different, their 95 percent confidence intervals overlap to varying degrees. But
when we look at the entire distribution in Figure 8, we note that GAIN first-order sto-
chastically dominates AFDC, and in turn is dominated by the choice and mandated poli-
cies.  Thus, in comparing the entire distribution of values, a very strong ranking emerges
based on SWF(1).
26
                                                       
25 The findings are much sharper than would be obtained using Manski’s (1995) extreme bounds analysis
of what he calls the “mixture problem.” Of course, the sharper findings come at a price: the willingness to
specify a likelihood model. But having paid the price the advantage is a full posterior distribution for the
outcomes of interest, allowing for a richer analysis of individual decisions.
26 It would not be a surprising conclusion that one distribution first-order stochastically dominates another
given that their means differ. But the argument is that it is more informative to compare the entire predic-
tive distributions of outcomes of programs than to compare the means of their empirical distributions, as
is normally done.23
In column 2, we see that adding AFDC receipts and food stamps to the analysis
does not alter the ranking.  GAIN produces “a larger pie” than AFDC ($2640 compared
with $2506), with the mandated and choice mechanisms doing slightly better than GAIN
($2728 and $2756).  When individuals are allowed to choose, we see a pattern similar to
that in column 1.
Social welfare function (3) ranks the policy alternatives by the criterion of putting
people to work. GAIN (in keeping with its stated mandate) does succeed in putting more
people to work than AFDC, although the magnitude of the difference is not large (a 0.21,
compared with 0.18, post-treatment probability of employment).  The mandated policy
succeeds in putting more people to work than GAIN (a 0.24 probability of employment)
and slightly more than the choice (1) policy (which produces a 0.22 probability of em-
ployment). Again, when individuals are risk averse, we see a pattern similar to that in col-
umns 1 and 2.
Social welfare function (4) considers the fiscal criterion, and reveals that GAIN is
clearly the most expensive of the policies ($5755 per person per quarter) and AFDC is the
cheapest ($2101); the posterior confidence intervals for these two policies do not overlap.
To some extent this is not surprising, because GAIN differs from AFDC precisely in of-
fering costly education and training, services that AFDC recipients would have to pay for
at their own expense.
27 When participants are assigned individually, the pattern is similar
to that found in column 1. Social welfare function (5) reveals that the increased earnings
realized by assigning all individuals into GAIN do not offset the increased costs when
compared with AFDC (a net difference of –$165 per person per quarter), but do offset the
                                                       
27 Of course, this ignores the issue of non-GAIN sources of funding.24
costs when a subset of individuals are assigned (or choose) to join GAIN (increased earn-
ings net of costs are $167). Figure 9 illustrates that the ranking of the first four policies
implied by SWF(5) in fact amounts to first-order stochastic dominance.
Thus, combining SWF (1), (2), and (3) with SWF (4) and (5) suggests that the
policies which allow choice regarding individual assignment to treatment and control
dominate the policy in which they are all assigned to GAIN: such policies are cheaper and
result in higher average earnings per person. Choice mechanisms also dominate AFDC,
though in the more limited sense of increased earnings net of cost. With the caveat that we
take individual utility to be a function only of earnings, we can conclude that allowing a
career counselor to assign individuals into treatment and control groups makes both indi-
viduals and the social planner better off; thus we reach a positive assessment of the treat-
ment. In contrast, ignoring the possibility of differential assignment, one would conclude
that GAIN has a mixed and limited impact on individual earnings, with its benefits more
than offset by the increased costs of the program.
Another set of concerns for the policymaker is the distribution of the benefits from
GAIN (see Heckman, Smith, and Clements [1997] for a related analysis) . Table 9b ex-
amines the ex post inequality generated by the policies in Table 9a. It presents percentiles
of the predictive distributions of earnings in each program (averaged over the 13 quarters
and 1360 individuals).  The 5th and 25th percentiles of the distribution for each of the five
policies is zero. The differences among the policies emerge in the upper percentiles.  The
75th percentile is lower for AFDC than for the choice policies ($601 compared with
$772), but is higher than for GAIN ($491). This underscores the point which arose in ear-
lier discussion, namely that the benefits from GAIN are far from uniform. For many indi-25
viduals, the expected earnings achieved through GAIN are lower than what they would
have achieved through AFDC. The difference between GAIN and AFDC arises in the up-
per tail of the distribution, for example at the 95th percentile; this is depicted graphically in
Figure 10. Looking at the difference between the 90th and 10th percentiles, we note that
the voluntary policies produce more inequality than either GAIN or AFDC (a 90-10
spread of $1616 compared with $1252 and $1312).
28
Table 9c examines ex ante inequality by applying a range of standard social welfare
functions to the predictive distribution of post-treatment earnings. The utilitarian, Rawl-
sian, log, and intermediate social welfare functions discussed in Section 7.2 are applied to
the certainty equivalents of the distributions of earnings for each individual. Thus, the so-
cial welfare rankings do not require any standard errors or confidence intervals; uncer-
tainty is already accounted for in the certainty equivalents. Table 9c reveals that if the
policymaker is sufficiently inequality-averse (as embodied in SWFs (7) to (9)), then he will
prefer AFDC to GAIN.  But, under both the inequality-neutral and inequality-averse
specifications, the choice policies will be preferred to both GAIN and AFDC. This finding
is not trivial. Although each individual must have weakly higher utility under a choice
mechanism as compared to being assigned to GAIN or AFDC, depending on the policy-
maker’s aversion to inequality, the social ranking may not mirror the individual ranking.
In summary, from Table 9a we learn that, the choice mechanism dominates both
GAIN and AFDC in terms of earnings. In terms of welfare expenditures, AFDC is the
cheapest policy, although the choice mechanism again dominates once the increased earn-
ings realized through the treatment are netted out. In Table 9b we see that the benefits
                                                       
28 Because the joint distribution of earnings is not identified, we cannot make claims about how particular26
from GAIN are enjoyed at the upper end of the earnings distribution, and that a choice
mechanism produces more inequality in the distribution of earnings than either AFDC or
GAIN.  Finally, from Table 9c, we learn that even a policymaker who is inequality-averse
would prefer the distribution under a choice mechanism to both GAIN and AFDC.
9. Conclusion
This paper examines the implications of shifting the emphasis in program evaluation from
examining average treatment effects and their statistical significance to looking at the un-
derlying decision problems.  Two main differences emerge.
First, by looking at the entire distribution of earnings under treatment and control
for a wide range of individuals, I conclude that for most individuals the choice between
GAIN and AFDC is clear-cut, with over half of the sample preferring GAIN to AFDC.
This contrasts with the conclusion one would reach by considering the statistical signifi-
cance of differences in means, which are not significant for post-treatment earnings for the
sample as a whole. The group benefiting from GAIN is identified as those individuals with
higher pre-treatment earnings.
Second, the policy of assigning individuals into treatment and control based on
pre-treatment characteristics dominates GAIN; it yields higher average earnings and leads
to lower government expenditure. By the criterion of increased earnings net of increased
costs, this policy also dominates AFDC. This illustrates the importance of thinking about
how a program will (or can) be made available in a post-evaluation context, and of incor-
porating these possibilities into the evaluation of the program. If the possibility of assign-
                                                                                                                                                                    
individuals fare relative to the distribution in each program. See Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997).27
ing only some individuals into the treatment is ignored, then GAIN would be rejected by
most of the social welfare criteria considered because the average increase in participants’
earnings does not outweigh the increase in costs. But by allowing individuals to be differ-
entially assigned into GAIN and AFDC, GAIN does substantially benefit some individuals;
if the program were made available to them, it would be viable by most social welfare cri-
teria.
These results are certainly important for an analysis of the GAIN data, but are also
relevant to many other exercises in program evaluation. For any program in which there is
heterogeneity in the treatment impact, there is potentially a role for differential assignment
into treatment. This is especially true for programs in which the gains from the treatment
do not exceed the cost for some individuals. Also, the importance of comparing outcomes
under different programs using their predictive distributions rather than simply the first
moments of their empirical distributions applies quite broadly to other evaluations. The
relevance of this framework extends beyond the case of randomized experiments consid-
ered here. In non-experimental settings, if a sufficiently rich set of covariates were ob-
served (justifying the assumption of selection on observable covariates) and if one condi-
tions on them in a flexible way, then the same methodology can be adopted (see Rubin
[1977, 1978]).
The model can be extended in a number of directions. First, in some policy con-
texts, there may exist substantial prior information regarding the control program. Such
information could readily be incorporated into the priors of the model. Second, there is
scope to add greater heterogeneity, perhaps by using a hierarchical model to incorporate
many more interactions. Third, the model could be modified to forecast beyond the 1328
quarters included in the dataset to extend the evaluation to longer horizons. Fourth, the
individual “choice” framework of assignment by a career counselor could be extended to
allow individuals to incorporate private information into their decisions; the policymaker
then would not simply offer individuals a choice but would design incentive-compatible
assignment mechanisms. These are subjects for future research.Appendix A: The Priors and Estimation Procedure
A.1 The Estimation Procedure
The posterior distribution of the parameters of the two models (P) and (M) are obtained
through Gibbs sampling procedures. The Gibbs sampler is a Markov chain Monte Carlo
simulation technique which simulates the joint posterior of the parameters of the model.
Instead of drawing directly from the joint posterior (often intractable), it draws succes-
sively from the posterior of each parameter (or block of parameters) conditional on all of
the other parameters.  For any starting values (given certain conditions), these draws will
eventually converge to draws from the true posterior (see Geman and Geman [1984],
Gelfland and Smith [1990], Tanner and Wong [1987], as well as Chamberlain and Imbens
[1996], Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin [1996], and Rossi, McCulloch, and Allenby
[1995]).
In many cases, such as the probit and mixture models, the task of drawing from the
joint posterior is simplified by augmenting the parameter space of the model. For the pro-
bit model, the parameter space is expanded to include the latent variables yit
**; conditional
on these, the probit model reduces to a standard regression model, and, conditional on all
other parameters, it is easy to draw from the posterior distribution of yit
**.  For the mixture
model, the parameter space is expanded to include indicators for which component of the
mixture each observation is drawn from; again, conditional on these indicators, it is easy to
update the other parameters, and vice versa.
A.2. The Probit Model
The Gibbs sampling algorithm for the probit model has been worked out by Albert and
Chib [1993] (see also Chib [1992], and Chib and Greenberg [1994]).
We stack the observations in the form:
y x it it it
** = + b e
for y y y y y it i i i i
** ** ** ** ** ( , , , ) ˛ =
1 2 K
t ¢, for i=1,...,I, I=1,360, and t=13. Of course, yit
** is not
observed. The key to the Gibbs sampling procedure is that conditional on b, it is easy to
draw from the posterior distribution of yit
**, and then using these to draw from the poste-
rior of b. Given diffuse priors for b and an arbitrary starting value b
(0), the Gibbs sampling
scheme is then:
(1) Conditional on b
(j), draw values for yit
**: for {it : yit
*=0}, from the negative
portion of a normal distribution with mean  xitb
(j) and variance 1, and for {it : yit
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From an arbitrary starting value, this is iterated 2,000 times, producing ( ) YZ
j j ( ) ( ) ,b .
The first 500 iterations are discarded, leaving 1,500 draws from the posterior distribution
of the parameters, which will be indexed j=1,...,1,500.
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A.3. The Mixture Model
When proper parametric priors are used, the Gibbs sampler for a mixture model is
straightforward. It is, however, essential that priors be informative to some extent. Even
though with parametric priors it is possible to identify the mixture, without sufficient prior
information the computational algorithm can break down (see Robert [1996], and also
Geweke and Keane [1996]). In setting up the Gibbs sampler, prior information is incorpo-
rated in two ways. First, the prior requires that q>0; a normal prior (with mean zero and
large variance) is used, and truncated suitably. Second, prior information is provided about
the variance of each component, s
2 and t
2, in the form of the number of prior observations
and the specified prior variance for each component. For s
2, the prior is 30 observations
with a sample variance of 1.5, similar to the variance arising in a single component normal
model for this data. The 5th and 95th percentiles of the prior are 1.03 and 2.41. Though
this is reasonably tight, in the updating procedure the weight on the prior will be very low
(see the discussion below). For t
2, the prior is 30 observations with a sample variance of
0.25, with the aim of picking up peaked segments observed in the empirical distribution.
(The 5th and 95th percentiles of this prior are 0.17 and 0.41.)
A flat prior is used for g. The prior on p is expressed in terms of the number of
prior observations seen from each component of the mixture; these are set to 1 for each













The Gibbs chain generates a latent variable, zi, which is an indicator for which of
the two components a given observation originates from (1 if it is from the first compo-
nent, 0 for the second). Conditional on zi, the chain is straightforward, and conditional on
all other parameters it is easy to update the z’s (see Robert [1996]). Take starting values
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29 Several diagnostics suggest that throwing out the first 500 runs is sufficient to converge to draws from
the posterior.  These include considering a wide variety of starting points, running the sampler for more
iterations, and comparing the mean of the posterior of the parameters with maximum likelihood estimates
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X corresponding to z
(j)=1. We see that the posterior weights the prior and the
sample information by the number of prior and sample observations; with over 3,000 ob-
servations, clearly most of the weight will be on sample information.
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Beta(a1+n1,a2+n2). With a1=a2=1, little weight will be placed on the prior.
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, where  f1( ) ￿  and  f2( ) ￿  are the
densities for each observation of the first and second components of the mixture as given
above in (M), and  pk
j ( ) +1 =p
(j+1) (=1–p
(j+1)) if k=1 (if k=2). For each it, draw u~Uniform, and
set zit
j ( ) + =
1 1 if u £ pit,1, and 0 otherwise.
From an arbitrary starting value, this is iterated 2,000 times, producing
( z
j ( ) ,g
( ) j ,s
( ) j ,t
( ) j ,q
( ) j , p
j ( )), j=1,2,...,2,000. The first 500 iterations are discarded,
leaving 1,500 draws from posterior distribution of the parameters.
A.4 The Predictive Distribution
Consider the (I+1)st individual, who is exchangeable with (and may, or may not, have
been one of) the individuals in the original sample. Denote by XI+1 the exogenous covari-
ates corresponding to XI+1,1,..., XI+1,13, so that it includes pre-treatment covariates and
earnings, and the entire set of period indicators for periods 1 to 13 (defined in Section
4.1), but does not include earnings information in post-treatment periods. As well, XI+1
includes a treatment indicator, which we take to be 1 (or 0) to imagine I+1 as part of the
treatment group (control group).32
Taking both the probit and mixture models together, we wish to compute the joint




p Y Y Y Data X
p Y X p Y Y X
p Y Y X p Data d
I I I I
I I I I I
I I I
( , , , | , )
( | , ) ( | , , )




+ + + +




11 1 2 113 1





where Q={b,g,q,s,t,p}. Conditional on parameters, we use the likelihoods defined in (P)
and (M):
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where the probability of positive earnings corresponds to the probit model and the density
for positive earnings to the mixture model. Finally, we integrate out for the unknown pa-
rameters using their posterior distribution.33
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Data Legend
Variable Description
CHILD4 Number of children less than age 4
CHILD45 Number of children between ages 4 and 5
CHILD611 Number of children between ages 6 and 11
CHILD18 Number of children between ages 12 and 18
CHILD19 Number of children aged 19 and greater
CAREAD Score on reading test
CAMATH Score on mathematics test
GRADE Educational attainment (grade 0 to 20)
HRWAGE Most recently recorded hourly wage
FAM.TYPE Indicator for households with single head
AGE Age
EXPER. Indicator for experimental unit
CONTROL Indicator for control unit
SEXF Indicator for female participants
REFUGEE Indicator of refugee status
CUR.AFDC Indicator for receiving AFDC in pre-experimental time
PREVTR Indicator for previous training or job search activities
ETH. WHITE Ethnicity Indicator, White
ETH. HISP. Ethnicity Indicator, Hispanic
ETH.BLACK Ethnicity Indicator, Black
ETH.NATIVE Ethnicity Indicator, Native Indian
ETH.IND.CH. Ethnicity Indicator, Indo-Chinese
ETH.OTH.AS Ethnicity Indicator, Other Asian
ETH.PACF. Ethnicity Indicator, Pacific Islander
ETH.FILIP. Ethnicity Indicator, Filipino
ETHOTHR Ethnicity Indicator, Other
AVG.UNEMP Average county unemployment rate, at registration
PEARNx Earnings in quarter x of pre-experimental time
PEARNxZ Indicator of zero earnings, pre-experimental quarter x
EARNx Earnings in quarter x of post-experimental time
EARNxZ Indicator of zero earnings, post-experimental quarter x
PAFDCx AFDC receipts, pre-experimental quarter x
AFDCx AFDC receipts, post-experimental quarter x
PFDSTMPx Food Stamps receipts, pre-experimental quarter x
FDSTMPx Food Stamps receipts, post-experimental quarter x
EMPPQx Employment status, pre-experimental quarter x
EMPQx Employment status, post-experimental quarter x37
Table 1:  The Sample
Alameda Butte Los
Angeles
Riverside San Diego Tulare
GAIN:
Treated Group 685 1717 3730 5808 8711 2693
Control Group 682 458 2124 1706 1810 1146
Total 1367 2175 5854 7514 10521 3839
AFDC:
Total 30305 5663 231356 24000 50958 14673
Notes:   The GAIN sample sizes are from the public use file of the GAIN data.  The AFDC total
represents the number of AFDC cases (both single-parent and two-parent households) in the six
evaluation counties in December 1990 (see  Riccio, et al. (1994), Table 1.1).38









































Table 3:  Treatment Effect on Probability of Unemployment
Post-experimental
period














Note:  A probit is used; covariates include variables for the number of children (CHILD4-CHILD19),
reading and writing test scores, grade, age, sex, ethnicity, and earnings histories (PEARN10-PEARN1).
The treatment effect is computed as the discrete difference between the probability of unemployment with
the treatment indicator set to 0 and 1, where the value of other covariates is set to their sample mean.  The
delta method is used to compute standard errors.40



















Table 5a:  Characteristics of an Individual (“Ms. Thirteen Fifty-Three”)
CHILD4 CHILD45 CHILD611 CHILD18 CHILD19 CAREAD CAMATH GRADE HRWGE FAM.TYPE
0 0 0 1 0 241 225 15 8 30
AGE SEXF REFUGEE ETH.WHT ETH.HSP AVG.UNEM PEARN10 PEARN9 PEARN8 PEARN7
42 1 0 1 0 4.1 0 0 0 3667
PEARN6 PEARN5 PEARN4 PEARN3 PEARN2 PEARN1 PAFDC7 PAFDC6 PAFDC5 PAFDC4
425 0 0 0 0 0 1605 1605 1551 1443
PAFDC3 PAFDC2 PAFDC1
1518 1518 1518
Table 5b:  Characteristics of an Individual (“Ms. One”)
CHILD4 CHILD45 CHILD611 CHILD18 CHILD19 CAREAD CAMATH GRADE HRWGE FAM.TYPE
0 0 1 2 0 221 191 9 2.5 30
AGE SEXF REFUGEE ETH.WHT ETH.HSP AVG.UNEM PEARN10 PEARN9 PEARN8 PEARN7
32 1 0 0 1 3.07 0 0 0 0
PEARN6 PEARN5 PEARN4 PEARN3 PEARN2 PEARN1 PAFDC7 PAFDC6 PAFDC5 PAFDC4
0 0 0 0 0 0 2259 2364 2364 2364
PAFDC3 PAFDC2 PAFDC1
2364 2472 2472
Table 5c:  Characteristics of an Individual (“Ms. Ten”)
CHILD4 CHILD45 CHILD611 CHILD18 CHILD19 CAREAD CAMATH GRADE HRWGE FAM.TYPE
0 0 2 0 0 223 240 10 5.85 30
AGE SEXF REFUGEE ETH.WHT ETH.HSP AVG.UNEM PEARN10 PEARN9 PEARN8 PEARN7
27 1 0 1 0 3.7 0 0 0 0
PEARN6 PEARN5 PEARN4 PEARN3 PEARN2 PEARN1 PAFDC7 PAFDC6 PAFDC5 PAFDC4
0 0 0 0 0 0 1899 1899 1926 1989
PAFDC3 PAFDC2 PAFDC1
1989 1989 208242





















1 0.12 21 96 0.05 38 294
2 0.26 35 135 0.10 37 201
3 0.36 215 418 0.12 246 900
4 0.47 360 587 0.15 342 1358
5 0.53 443 659 0.15 367 1291
6 0.55 536 985 0.18 430 1258
7 0.59 590 797 0.22 596 1618
8 0.62 650 820 0.21 640 1924
9 0.66 301 1190 0.22 202 697
10 0.67 276 567 0.23 277 1291
11 0.68 890 1025 0.23 893 2490
12 0.67 882 1049 0.22 765 2097
13 0.69 368 900 0.18 285 143243
Table 6b: Predicted Earnings, With and Without Uncertainty, Ms. Ten
Ignoring parameter uncertainty Accounting for parameter uncertainty



















1 29 217 51 245 23 220 40 233
2 76 356 131 581 77 340 119 502
3 208 851 207 701 179 718 227 772
4 316 1014 292 994 302 1127 285 955
5 349 1124 309 986 260 1316 329 1085
6 429 1328 322 1020 376 1277 384 1141
7 443 1427 399 1534 491 1657 417 1330
8 162 1498 200 1116 581 1715 428 1222
9 638 1710 383 1272 640 1857 463 1385
10 674 1813 533 1537 639 2058 478 1448
11 844 1880 514 1501 679 1882 575 1709
12 641 1870 611 1755 604 1912 589 1716
13 898 2570 628 1860 738 2062 484 1836
Log utility
* 48.85 48.53 48.72 48.75
CRRA (3)
* 4.86607 4.86606 4.86606 4.86607
Note: 
* For expected utility comparisons, $100 is added to the distribution of treated and control earnings.44
Table 7: Groups Benefiting the Most and Least































ETH. WHITE 0.19 0.17



















Notes: (a) Individuals whose expected utility is higher from total earnings under GAIN than AFDC,
where preferences are CRRA, with relative risk aversion equal to 3.
(b) The complement of (a).45















GAIN 463 2,425 0.2042 1,883 202
AFDC 372 2,359 0.1843 1,636 387
Standard
error
56 67 0.018 85 -48
Notes: (a) Means are computed from the empirical distribution.
(b) Costs are normalized to zero for AFDC, and are an additional $3638 for 13 quarters of GAIN.46
Table 9a: Social Welfare Comparisons for Five Different Policies, Alameda

























































Notes:  Each set of values of the parameters from the posterior distribution defines a state of the world.
For each state of the world the social welfare functions are computed.  Thus, there is a distribution of
these SWFs over the various states of the world.  These are summarized by the mean and the 2.5 and 97.5
percentiles of the distributions.
SWF(1):  Average earnings per individual.
SWF(2):  Total expected income (earnings + AFDC receipts + food stamp receipts).
SWF(3):  Expected proportion of individuals employed (i.e., greater than zero income), averaged over 13
post-experimental quarters.
SWF(4):  Total expected expenditure, which includes AFDC payments, food stamp payments, and, for
GAIN, includes administrative costs (in excess of AFDC administration) of $3,638 per individual for 13
quarters.
SWF(5): Increase in average earnings per person per quarter net of costs, relative to AFDC.
GAIN:  Mandatory participation in GAIN.
AFDC: Mandatory participation in AFDC.
Mandated:  Individuals are required to join the program that maximizes their chances of being employed.
Choice:  Individuals choose between AFDC and GAIN based on expected utilities (or certainty
equivalents):
(1):  risk-neutral agents, discount factor = 0.95;
(2):  risk-averse agents (CRRA,  ( ) u x x q
q ( ) ( ) / ( )
( ) = - -
- 1 1 1 ), q»1, discount factor = 0.95;
(3):                   "                                                     , q=3, discount factor=0.95.47
Table 9b:  Considering Ex Post Inequality, Quantiles of the Earning Distribution









































































Note:  Each cell presents the median of the posterior distribution of the percentile, and in parentheses the
5th and 95th posterior percentiles.48







GAIN 1.0483 0.5492 0.9998 -1.0357
AFDC 1 1 1 -1
Mandated 1.0817 0.8205 1.0036 -0.9760
Choice (1) 1.0927 1.0114 1.0049 -0.9614
Risk Averse, q» »1
GAIN 0.9892 0.2707 0.9949 -1.1240
AFDC 0.9487 0.1972 0.9936 -1.1593
Mandated 1.0098 0.1972 0.9972 -1.1033
Choice (2) 1.0144 0.2707 0.9977 -1.0896
Risk Averse, q=3
GAIN 0.9295 0.1994 1.0065 -1.2127
AFDC 0.9057 0.1153 1.0048 -1.3159
Mandated 0.9397 0.1153 1.0075 -1.2384
Choice (3) 0.9411 0.1994 1.0078 -1.1992
Notes: * Expected utilities are normalized.
SWF(6):   Utilitarian SWF, applied to certainty equivalent of income distribution.
SWF(7):   Rawlsian SWF, applied to certainty equivalent of income distribution.
SWF(8):   log SWF, applied to certainty equivalent of income distribution.







( ) ui i
, e=3, applied to certainty equivalent of income distribution.